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Political Party and Senatorial Succession:
A Response to Vikram Amar on How Best to
Interpret the Seventeenth Amendment
by SANFORD LEVINSON1
Vikram Amar is incapable of writing an uninteresting or
unchallenging article. This being happily said, I also must say that I
find myself in fundamental disagreement with his argument as to the
meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment. I think it is an example of
a brilliant explication of various trees that misses the reality of the
surrounding forest. I contrast my response to this article to that
several years ago when reading a piece that he coauthored with his
brother Akhil (a close, personal friend and a fellow coeditor of a
constitutional law casebook) that definitively demonstrated the
unconstitutionality of the current Succession in Office Act (the Act)
inasmuch as it makes the Speaker of the House (and then the
president pro tempore of the Senate) next in line to the vice president
to fill any vacancies in the Oval Office.2 Both that article and the one
under discussion are alike in making skillful use of the methods (or,
as my colleague Philip Bobbitt would label them, "modalities"3),
including the particular fillip identified with Akhil Amar,
"intratextuality."' Yet the first one absolutely convinced me, while
the new one leaves me decidedly skeptical.
1. W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Centennial Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
J.D., 1973, Stanford Law School; Ph.D., 1969, Harvard University; A.B., 1962, Duke
University. I am grateful to the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for
inviting to participate in an unusually interesting conference.
2. Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995).
3. See PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2001).
4. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). A more
skeptical account can be found in Ernest Young and Adrian Vermeule, Hercules, Herbert,
and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000).
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What accounts for the difference? The answer is relatively
simple: The first article is extraordinarily sensitive to the political
dimensions of a succession law that would allow a de-facto takeover
by the opposition party without its having to prove itself in a national
presidential election! It is unconstitutional in part because it is so
unwise with regard to the consequences it might generate. A
perverse incentive exists-particularly if there is no vice president-
for an opposite-party Speaker to be especially interested in initiating
impeachment proceedings as part of an effort to gain unmerited
political control over the executive branch. One might also be aware
of the potential for policy havoc even if the Speaker took over as the
result, say, of a president's temporary medical disability,6 let alone of
the "incentive" created by the Act for a deranged partisan to attempt
to change fundamental policy by means of assassinating a president in
circumstances where the successor would be an opposite-party
Speaker. It does not speak well for ostensibly serious students of the
Constitution (whether legal academics or pundits) that their article
failed to provoke the kinds of serious public discussion (and change)
it most certainly deserved. It is, though, precisely that political
dimension that is missing in the newer article.
It is not that Amar is anything less than a consummately skillful
lawyer in analyzing text, structure, and history. Rather, the problem
is, ultimately, that he begins with what I increasingly believe is the
wrong question when analyzing structural provisions of the
Constitution. Such provisions are, by and large, "hard wired" into the
Constitution in a way that is simply not true of the more "open-
textured" provisions that provide the basis for what is litigated before
courts, whether one thinks of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment or even the assignments of powers to Congress under
Article I, Section 8. We can fight with one another endlessly about
5. Putting to one side, of course, the degree to which the Electoral College itself is
contrary to the goal of having a genuinely national presidential election. See SANFORD
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES
WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 81-97 (Oxford Univ. Press
2006); see also Sanford Levinson, Should We Dispense with the Electoral College?,
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=8.
6. One recalls in this context several episodes from the late and much lamented West
Wing when a republican Speaker, played by John Goodman, took over the helm when the
democratic president, Jed Bartlett, had to take leave from his office because of the
personal conflict of interest posed by terrorists' having kidnapped his daughter. (The vice
president, as I recall, had been forced to resign prior to the existence of this situation.)
The new president, however temporary his term of office might be, had no hesitation to
reverse several of President Bartlett's foreign policies.
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the "best way" to interpret these provisions, but the barest familiarity
with American constitutional history reveals, for good or for ill, that
these provisions are altogether malleable. The most important thing
to do, with regard to their future interpretation, is to elect presidents
and senators who will appoint and confirm judges (or other officials
whose duties include constitutional interpretation, such as heads of
the Office of Legal Counsel within the Department of Justice) who
share one's own views.
Such interpretive flexibility is, generally speaking, not available
with regard to the truly structural Constitution. Whatever one thinks
of the fact that Wyoming and California have equal representation in
the Senate-which I personally find indefensible 7-we can be
confident that the issue is not subject to litigation, at least within
contemporary understandings of the "interpretive community" of
well-trained lawyers.8 I wonder, incidentally, if Amar would grant
standing to a Wyoming democrat to litigate the fetters placed on that
state's governor by the Wyoming legislature concerning the choice of
a successor to a senator who has died or resigned; after all, he
concludes his article by a very powerful call for the Senate "to step up
to its interpretive duties" of first-order constitutional interpretation,
which suggests that he might not be sympathetic to a lawsuit brought
by some Wyoming democrat who was statutorily excluded from the
pool that could be considered by the governor when picking the
successor to the late Senator Craig Thomas.
I strongly agree with Amar that it is a dreadful mistake to assign
to the judiciary a monopoly over constitutional interpretation;9 we
disagree, however, on what the Senate should have concluded if it
had the debate Amar advocates. So, how would I wish conscientious
senators to frame the question (and then reach what I believe to be
the correct result upholding the Wyoming legislature and the
constitutional legitimacy of the senator appointed under the
constraints it has placed on the governor) if the Senate embarked on
such a debate in the future? I strongly believe that the very first
question should be the following: How would we design the
Constitution in 2008 with regard to filling senatorial vacancies? Only
7. See LEVINSON, supra note 5, at 49-62.
8. On interpretive communities, see generally STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN
THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980).
9. See generally, SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (Princeton Univ.
Press 1988) (identifying and defending a "protestant" perspective with regard to
institutionalizing constitutional interpretation, as against a more "catholic" approach that
places such a duty uniquely in the Supreme Court).
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after resolving that question should we consider inquiries into text,
structure, and history. And, with regard to those interrogations, we
should ask whether the text, structure, and history so definitively
point in a direction different from our own answer to the first
question that we must reluctantly conclude that we must acquiesce to
just another "constitutional stupidity" that clutters up our
Constitution. ° It is not my view that lawyerly skill can always save us
from distinctly unhappy endings. But I obviously think we should ask
whether we can, consistent with adherence to legal craft, legitimately
find in the text, structure, and history "permission" (even if not "an
order") to do what we believe to be best given the realities of 2008.
I find myself in the unusual position of favorably quoting Justice
Scalia with regard to constitutional interpretation: "Words do have a
limited range of meaning, and no interpretation that goes beyond that
range is permissible."" This is true, particularly with regard to "hard-
wired" structures. But-and this is the all important caveat-Scalia
goes on to write that "context is everything, and the context of the
Constitution tells us not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give the
words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow interpretation-
though not an interpretation that the language will not bear."" One
might also quote James Madison's first rule of interpretation that he
conveyed to his colleagues in the first House of Representatives with
regard to the controversy over the propriety of chartering the Bank of
the United States: "Where the meaning is clear, the consequences,
whatever they may be, are to be admitted-where doubtful, it is fairly
triable by its consequences.""
I interpret both Scalia and Madison to suggest that if the
constitutional materials are indeed "clear," so that one would have to
make what an advocate herself would believe to be a "frivolous"
argument"'" in order to assert the contrary, then we are stuck, unless,
10. See CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William
Eskridge & Sanford Levinson eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 1998).
11. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 24 (1998). I am grateful to
Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith whose paper, Originalism's Living Constitutionalism
(February 6, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), reminded me of Scalia's
comment.
12. Id. at 37.
13. See The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791) in 13 Papers of James Madison (Charles F.
Hobson & Robert A Rutland eds., 1979). I note that Madison adds three other "rules,"
which may or may not be entirely congruent with his first rule.
14. But see Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at
All?, 24 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 353-78 (1986).
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of course, we view the consequences as so drastic as to warrant a self-
conscious decision to defy the Constitution.15 Deciding which
particular person should succeed a dead senator would not, except in
the oddest of circumstances, strike most people as having drastic
consequences. 6 In any event, we should begin with what I believe to
be the most appropriate initial question, which is how We the
People-the ostensible sovereigns of the American republic-would
choose to design our Constitution in 2008 with regard to the issue
presented.
My own view is that we (and the perhaps mythic "We") would
agree that in a political system where political parties play, for good
and sometimes for ill, such an important role in structuring what is
politically (im)possible, it would be foolish indeed to ignore the party
identity of the senator whose death or resignation has necessitated
the invocation of the Seventeenth Amendment's provision for
gubernatorial appointment of replacements. Especially in our own
era, where the two major parties are as ideologically divided as has
been the case in American politics for at least the past century, 7 the
presumptive majorities that voted for either the democratic or
republican senator to be replaced could well feel a sense of justified
outrage if a governor used his or her authority to negate that
preference and fill the vacant seat with a senator from the opposite
party (who would almost certainly be substantially to the right or the
left of the prior senator)." To be sure, one can conjure up scenarios
15. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Three Types of Constitutional Crises
(Apr. 24, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with editors) ("type-one" crises are those
in which decision makers self consciously defy the Constitution in the name of
"necessity"); CARL SCHMITr, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOLOGY 13 (pb. ed. 2005) ("For a
legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist.").
16. The situation would be different, however, if we were discussing the aftermath of
a terrorist attack that killed or disabled dozens of senators. See LEVINSON, supra note 5,
at 69-75; infra note 32 and accompanying text.
17. As measured, for example, in the relative solidarity of voting by party bloc in both
the House and the Senate on major legislation. Today it is the case that not only the
modal or median member of the Democratic and Republican Parties are quite distant
from one another on relevant ideological scales; there is also very little overlap at the
"tails" of the two parties, so that "liberal republicans" would be measurably more liberal
than "conservative democrats" and, in turn, "conservative democrats" would be
significantly more conservative than these "liberal republicans."
18. It would be far trickier to appoint a replacement for "independent senators." In
the case of Vermont's Bernie Sanders, it would be obvious that his replacement should be
a democrat, unless another prominent left-leaning "independent" (like Sanders, a self-
declared Socialist) were a plausible designate. Selecting a replacement for Connecticut's
Joseph Lieberman might present more complications, for he is clearly, on foreign policy,
far close to the Republican Party than to his former democratic colleagues. He has, after
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whereby the now-absent senator was narrowly reelected only because
of name recognition or a last-moment scandal that discredited the
favored opponent. But, after all, we are talking only about filling a
vacancy until the next scheduled election-and, in some cases, even
before then if a special election were called. If the majority is ready
to shift its preferences, it will have that opportunity in no less than
twenty-four months and, most often, even earlier. There is no good
reason for an "opposite-party governor" to anticipate that change
and, in effect, negate the consequences of the closest previous
election with regard to expressed party preference.
And consider also the fact that in recent years the Senate has
been extremely closely divided, so that the shift of political party
identification by even one senator could lead to a shift of power in the
Senate itself, with all of the ramifications that brings concerning
chairs of committees and the practical powers to control the agenda.
The country at large could pay a significant price for the decision of a
state's governor to honor the desire of his or her national political
party to control the Senate as against the desire of a state's majority
to have their own demonstrated preferences honored. If, of course,
one shared the partisan preferences of the appointment governor, one
would say that the country substantially benefits from this change of
control. The point is that it occurs because of a personal decision by
the governor as against any kind of election.
There is, of course, a good reason to place the replacement
power in the hands of the governor: A state legislature, as in my now
home state of Texas, might well be in recess,' 9 and time might be of
the essence with regard to making sure that the state has full
representation in the Senate. But there is also good reason to place
certain constraints on the governor, as the Wyoming legislature has
done, so that, as in that instance, the governor must pick from a list of
three possibilities submitted by the central committee of the former
senator's own political party. This law presumably has real bite only
if-as was the case in Wyoming-the governor is of a different party
from the senator. One can be fairly confident that most governors
who share a party affiliation with the late senator can exercise enough
all, endorsed Republican Senator John McCain for the presidency. On the other hand, on
domestic policy, he is more accurately described as a democrat, albeit a rather
conservative one. I note that the Wyoming statute in question takes account of the
possibility that the late senator was not affiliated with a political party. See Amar, supra
note 4.
19. The Texas Constitution provides that the state legislature meet only once every
other year for 150 days.
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control over state party leaders to make sure that at least one of the
names is fully acceptable-and, of course, it might even be his or her
own name! I confess that I might have greater confidence in the
situation if the legislature had, in effect, completely deprived the
governor of an effective role by mandating the appointment of the
single person recommended by the party's state leadership. This
could easily be interpreted as an illegitimate delegation of the
executive's authority to a private organization by depriving the
governor of any genuine choice at all in the matter. But so long as the
governor is provided some meaningful choice-and so long as one
can trust the state party leadership to pick other than a list of out-
and-out incompetents who would be recognized as such by the public
at large-I see no reason to object to a constitutional design as that
instantiated by the Wyoming process.
From my perspective, then, Professor Amar (or any other
opponent of the Wyoming process) has a very high burden to
overcome. I must be convinced that it is truly "frivolous" to interpret
the Constitution so as to allow the Wyoming procedure. So long,
however, as we regard the Seventeenth Amendment as "open to
interpretation," as it were, and so long as we concomitantly allow a
suitable attention to consequences to play some role in our final
interpretation, I have no trouble at all in giving Wyoming a
constitutional seal of approval.
So let's take a closer look at Professor Amar's arguments. As
one would expect, it begins with the text of the Seventeenth
Amendment itself, which in its relevant part provides that
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in
the Senate, the executive authority of each State shall issue
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
Are we forced, as speakers of English (or even of that particular
dialect called "legal English"), to say that this is the equivalent of the
two-senators-per-state or the "start of a new congressional session"
rules set out in the Constitution?21 I think not, even if I happily
concede that Professor Amar's interpretation is a "possible reading"
20. U.S. CONST. amend XVII, § 2 (emphasis added).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XX.
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of the Amendment and even, perhaps, a "better reading" than mine if
(and only if) one pays no attention to the consequences of each of our
readings.
Does "empower the executive" necessarily mean to place in the
executive an absolute discretion, save, presumably, only for
constitutional limitations concerning age, habitation, and duration of
citizenship?22 Would it be unconstitutional, for example, for a state
legislature to say that the governor cannot appoint his or her own
child, as happened recently in Alaska when Senator Frank
Murkowski traded in that job for service as Alaska's governor.
According to the Washington Post, "to the disgust of many Alaskans,
he selected his daughter, an obscure state legislator, to serve out his
Senate term" 3  (though Senator Murkowski was subsequently
retained in office by gaining the votes of 48.6 percent of the voters in
a multi-candidate race in which the democratic candidate received
only 45.5 percent of the vote).24 I see no reason to read the
Seventeenth Amendment (or the Qualifications Clause)" in such a
wooden matter, whatever a five-Justice majority might have said to
the contrary in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.26 I think it more
than legitimate to read the "empowerment" clause to include a role
for the legislature to limit the appointment power with reasonable
conditions designed to prevent what the legislature can reasonably
believe would be an abuse of discretionary power.
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. I am critical of the age and duration of citizenship
requirements. See LEVINSON, supra note 5, at 142-46. But I readily concede that it would
be unconstitutional for a governor to appoint a twenty-eight-year-old person or someone
who had been naturalized only five years prior to the appointment.
23. See Blaine Harden, Senator Murkowski's Big Problem: Dad the Governor, WASH.
POST, August 10, 2004, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dynarticles/A52838-2004Aug9.html.
24. See Wikipedia.com, United States Presidential Elections, 2004,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United States-presidentialelection, 2004. The raw voting
totals for the two candidates were, respectively, 147,942 to 138,551. See
WashingtonPost.com, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/elections/2004/akl. Though
irrelevant to the central subject matter of this exchange, these numbers underscore the
ludicrousness of equal voting power; consider that on the same night, 6,955,728 voters
returned Barbara Boxer to the Senate. See USElectionAtlas.org, 2004 Senatorial General
Election Results--California, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?year=2004&fips
=6&off=3&elect=0&f=0. Both the Peace and Freedom and Libertarian Party candidates
in California received far more votes than did Senator Murkowski, 243,846 and 216,522,
respectively. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
26. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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One might also argue, of course, that the final clause-"as the
legislature may direct"-applies to the "empowerment" clause as well
as the "special elections" clause. Grammarians might well disagree
about this. One's ultimate answer might well depend on the degree
to which one believes that constitutional drafters are like poets or
novelists like Ernest Hemingway in their concern for the placement
and grammatical implications of every single word. I confess that I
have no belief that drafters should be compared to such individually
exact writers. The Constitution is rife with badly or confusingly
drafted language, not least because constitutions almost always fit the
classic definition of a camel-"a horse drafted by a committee." If I
agreed that Professor Amar's solution to the constitutional issue
ostensibly presented by Wyoming were in fact one that I would adopt
as a 2008 drafter of a new Seventeenth Amendment, then I would
happily endorse his interpretation of the language. But I do not and,
therefore, will not.
Professor Amar, of course, moves on from linguistic/textual
arguments (and consideration of some Supreme Court cases
examining the meaning of words like "legislature") to make what for
"originalists" may appear to be an even stronger argument rooted in
history. Section III.A. of Professor Amar's article is titled "The
History of Direct Election and the Seventeenth Amendment Reflects
a Distrust of Political Parties, Especially of Party Bosses." I have no
reason to dispute his historical account. I have not looked sufficiently
into the history myself, and I certainly believe that Professor Amar
offers a fair and complete, albeit necessarily truncated, review of the
historical record. But what exactly follows from this if one is a
constitutional interpreter and not an historian?
Let's assume that the proponents of the Amendment were
motivated not only to make the selection of senators more
democratic, but also to clip the power of "political bosses." That is
not what the text says. There is no mention at all of political parties
or of "political bosses" in the text. What proponents might have
believed, though, is that shifting the totally discretionary power of
appointment to governors rather than leaving it with legislatures
would in fact be an effective means to diminish the relevance of
political party identity. Whereas legislators, by stipulation, would be
party hacks, thinking only of partisan political advantage, the
governor would fulfill eighteenth-century conceptions of civic virtue
who would ask only "who is the best person to fill this position,
independent of political party identity?" With respect, let me suggest
this is an idle fantasy, similar to the fantasy that members of the
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Electoral College would ask only who was most fit to serve as
president of the United States. That particular vision was in utter
shambles no later than 1800, when the stupidity of the initial draft of
the Electoral College clause led to the brink of national collapse.27
Similarly, any Progressive Era notions that an age of "non-
partisanship" would follow a repudiated system of "party
government" had no staying power.
Even if one laments it, the reality of American politics, as noted
earlier, is the centrality of political parties. State governors, with rare
exceptions,' are important members of their state party's hierarchy.
If one doubts their designation as "party bosses," it may be only
because in the modern era it is hard to designate anyone as a "party
boss" in the sense that term was used in the Progressive Era or, for
that matter, as late as the 1960s with regard to such individuals as
Chicago's Mayor Richard J. Daley. Consider in this regard an
editorial published by the New York Times on March 8, 2008, which
notes that New York's Governor Eliot Spitzer "controls" that state's
Democratic Party.29 The fact that modern governors may not be
"bosses" does not lessen their identity one whit, by and large, as
thoroughly political and partisan creatures.
Recall Robert Bork's famous (or, for some, notorious) defense
of the propriety of Brown v. Board of Education° in the teeth of
evidence demonstrating that most of the congressional proponents of
the amendment stipulated that it would not cover school segregation.
Bork, of course, was a noted "originalist," and one might have
thought that Brown might present a problem for him. Not so.
Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee during his ill-fated
hearings upon being nominated for the Supreme Court by President
Ronald Reagan, Bork stated that
[The framers] wrote a clause that does not say anything about
separation. They wrote a clause that says "equal protection of
the laws." I think it may well be true... that they had an
assumption.., that equality could be achieved with separation.
Over the years it became clear that that assumption would not
27. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005).
28. California's Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger may be one of them, courtesy of
the California Constitution's "recall" provision, added during the Progressive Era.
29. Editorial, A One-Party New York State, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008, at A14,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/08/opinion/08sat2.html.
30. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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be borne out in reality ever. Separation would never produce
equality.
I think when the background assumption proved false, it was entirely
proper for the Court to say "we will carry out the rule they wrote"
and if they would have been a little surprised that it worked out this
way, that is too bad. That is the rule they wrote and they assumed
something that is not true.
And in that way I do not think any damage is done, and you can
even look at it more severely. You could say suppose they had
written a clause that said "we want equality and that can be achieved
by separation and we want that too." By 1954 it was perfectly
apparent that you could not have both equality and separation. Now
the court has to violate one aspect or the other of that clause, as I
have framed it hypothetically. It seems to me that the way the actual
amendment was written, it was natural to choose the equality
segment, and the court did so. I think it was proper constitutional
law, and I think we are all better off for it.3
Similarly, I think that one might say that some proponents of the
Seventeenth Amendment believed that placing unfettered discretion
in the hands of presumptively virtuous governors would be an
effective way of diminishing the role that partisan politics would play
in selecting senators. They were wrong, precisely in the same way
that those who believed that segregation was consistent with equality
were manifestly wrong. To honor the demonstrably incorrect
empirics of Seventeenth Amendment proponents solely because of
evidence in the historical record as to their own assumptions would
be necessary only if they had written the Amendment in a language
that made such a conclusion truly compelling. As has already been
demonstrated, there is no such necessity. Not only is it not necessary
to read the Seventeenth Amendment in the way suggested by
Professor Amar; it would also be improper to do so, precisely for the
consequentialist reasons that I have been emphasizing.
There is an even more ominous possibility, suggested earlier, that
deserves more extended discussion.32 Unfortunately, it is not fanciful
to imagine an attack on Washington that would kill dozens of
senators. It would, of course, be absolutely essential to fill these
31. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 284-86
(1987).
32. See supra note 16.
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vacancies as soon as possible. I confess that I was surprised to learn
from Professor Amar's article that several states have not authorized
their governors to make appointments, thus consigning those states to
diminished representation in the Senate until an election is held.
Were I drafting a new Seventeenth Amendment, I would require
states to have in place a procedure that would allow for functionally
immediate replacement, at least when the number of vacancies
exceeds a certain number, such as, say, fifteen. And if states refused
to pass enabling legislation, I would allow Congress itself to pass
corrective legislation. But the language does not seem to require
states to pass enabling legislation, and I agree that under the
Constitution we have,33  states are free to deny themselves
representation in the Senate, even if that decision imposes external
costs on the rest of the nation as well.
A joint commission of the American Enterprise Institute and the
Brookings Institution has issued a report, Preserving Our
Institutions," that addresses the necessity of replenishing the Senate
after a catastrophic attack. Is it not fairly obvious that terrorists
should not be able to transfer control of the Senate from one political
party to another by virtue of the fact that partisan governors of a
party different from the dead senator would be unable to resist the
temptation to reward a fellow partisan (or, perhaps, to name him or
herself to the office)? Indeed, if one is sufficiently sensitive to awful
possibilities, is it not the case that Professor Amar's reading of the
Amendment might offer an incentive to political assassins to attack
even one or two given senators in the hope that his or her
replacement by a senator of the other party might shift the overall
control of the Senate, as would have been the case between 2000-2002
and 2006-2008?
Do I believe that the Seventeenth Amendment is a perfectly
drafted amendment for twenty-first century America? Definitely not.
33. As Bob Woodward commented in a symposium at the University of Texas, "we
conduct our politics under the Constitution we have, not the Constitution we'd like to
have."
35. Continuity of Education Commission, Preserving Our Institutions: The First
Report of the Continuity of America, May 2003, http:/vwww.continuityofgovenment.
org/report/FustReport.pdf.
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But, to return to the central theme, the fact that the Seventeenth
Amendment, as written, does not provide "slam-dunk" evidence for
my preferred reading does not mean, logically or otherwise, that it
necessarily supports Professor Amar's reading. All one can say is that
each of us offers plausible, non-frivolous readings of the text. Which
of us has offered the better overall argument is up to readers to
decide.
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